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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 
(1987) and Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court's award of $1,100.00 per month in alimony to 
Plaintiff constituted an abuse of discretion in light of the parties' twenty-five year marriage and 
the $57,000.00 difference in their annual incomes. A trial court's ruling on alimony will not 
be disturbed on appellate review as long as the Court exercises its discretion within the bounds 
and under the standards set by appellate courts and has supported its decision with adequate 
findings and conclusions. Bell v. Bell. 810 P.2d 489 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
2. Whether the trial court committed a clear abuse of discretion or caused 
manifest injustice by failing to award the Defendant a greater portion of funds from the sale of 
the parties' marital home. A trial court's distribution of property in a divorce action is endowed 
with a presumption of validity and appellate courts will not disturb it on appeal unless it is 
clearly unjust or constitutes a clear abuse of discretion. Rasband v. Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is an appeal from an Order of the lower court (R. at 43), and from 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. at 57), by which the court granted the Plaintiff an 
award of $1,100.00 per month in permanent alimony and divided the proceeds from the sale of 
the parties' marital home equally. 
B. Disposition of Case Below. 
Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a Complaint for Divorce on 
December 3, 1992. The case was tried before the Honorable Michael D. Lyon on September 
28, 1993. The court entered its decision on October 27, 1993 and the court entered its Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Decree of Divorce on November 29, 1993. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff and Defendant were married on December 8, 1967. They had been 
married 25 years when this divorce action was filed in December of 1992. Two children were 
born during the marriage, Kimberly, a minor daughter who shall turn 18 and graduate from high 
school in June of 1994 (T. at 6-7), and Tiffany, who has already attained majority status (T. at 
57). 
Pursuant to a stipulation between the parties, Mrs. Crompton has retained sole 
custody of Kimberly with Mr. Crompton paying child support to Mrs. Crompton in the amount 
of $285.00 per month after receiving a $46.00 credit for payment of Kimberly's health insurance 
premium. Tiffany is employed full-time and resides with Mr. Crompton and Mr. Crompton's 
female companion, who is also employed. (T. at 57). 
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Mr. Crompton is employed at Kimberly-Clark Corporation where he earns $18.22 
per hour for a monthly base pay of $3,158.74. This base pay, however, accounts for only 
approximately 50 percent of Mr. Crompton's historical income. During the four years betweem 
1989 and 1992, Mr. Crompton's average annual earnings at Kimberly-Clark totalled $67,776.60. 
(Plaintiffs Exhibit 6). He appeared to be earning at a rate in excess of this average during 
1993, having earned $50,806.34 as of September 12, 1993. (Plaintiffs Exhibit 3). Extrapolating 
this amount according to the 365 days in a year, Mr. Crompton would earn of $72,722.80 in 
1993 if he continued to work at the same pace he had been working at the time of trial. 
The substantial difference between Mr. Crompton's base pay and his annual 
earnings is accounted for through overtime and shift-differential pay. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 3; T 
at 73-74). The uncontested evidence at trial indicated that Mr. Crompton had consistently 
worked between 20 to 30 hours a week in overtime, for which he is compensated at a rate of 
one-and-a-half times his regular hourly rate. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 3). Mr. Crompton also receives 
double his base hourly wage if he works a Sunday shift, which he has frequently elected to do. 
Mr. Crompton testified that this shift-differential pay is not for overtime work. (T. at 74). All 
evidence at trial indicated that Mr. Crompton has consistently maintained this type of overtime 
or shift-differential regimen for at least 8 years prior to the parties' divorce. Mr. Crompton 
admitted that he has the discretion to work up to 20 hours a week in overtime if he desires. (T. 
at 73). Based on Mr. Crompton's work history, the trial court found that Mr. Crompton should 
reasonably be imputed an income of $4,935.00 per month for purposes of determining alimony. 
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(R. at 47; 61). The court arrived at this figure simply by attributing 15 hours per week in 
overtime to Mr. Crompton. The trial court did not include any shift-differential income in its 
calculations regarding Mr. Crompton's income. 
In contrast to Mr. Crompton, Mrs. Crompton is employed at Mervyn's as a retail 
sales clerk at a rate of $7.75 per hour, or $1,343 per month and $16,116 annually. (Plaintiffs 
Exhibit 1). Her net income after taxes and deductions totals $1,007.00 per month. (Plaintiffs 
Exhibit 1). The trial court found that Mrs. Crompton is 45 years old, was married at the age 
of 19, has worked primarily in retail sales, has worked a total of 16 years of the marriage, and 
is "probably employed at her highest and best employment." (R. at 48). Assuming Mrs. 
Crompton earned $16,116 in 1993, she would have made approximately $56,500 less than Mr. 
Crompton's $72,722. Mrs. Crompton earned an average of only $10,669 per year for the four 
year period between 1989 and 1992. (Plaintiffs Exhibit 6). This amount is approximately 
$57,100 less per year than Mr. Crompton's annual earnings for the same period. 
The parties enjoyed a comfortable standard of living during the marriage. (T. at 
19). They lived in an expensive home with a house payment of approximately $1,000 per 
month. (T. at 50-51). They purchased large items of furniture on a regular basis. They 
enjoyed such items as a Tahiti Boat, Mountain Bikes, Camcorders, and apparently purchased 
numerous items from Nordstrom's, ZCMI, and Mervyn's. (T. at 59-64). All evidence 
presented to the trial court indicated that Plaintiff and Defendant lived a lifestyle that was fully 
commensurate with their joint average incomes of nearly $78,000 per year during the last 5 
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years of the marriage. Indeed, not only did they consume their entire incomes to support their 
lifestyle, their standard of living during the marriage was sufficiently high that they also 
maintained a significant amount of debt. 
Mrs. Crompton now lives in circumstances that are considerably below the 
standard of living during the marriage, even if the $1,100 alimony award is included in her 
income. She is currently relegated to a small two bedroom apartment where she lives with her 
minor daughter. (T. at 21-22). She drives a 10 year old Toyota vehicle with approximately 
200,000 miles on it. (T. at 23). Although her minor daughter has some limited part-time 
employment, Mrs. Crompton is essentially the sole income producer in the household for 
purposes of contributing to household expenses. (T. at 19-20). Based on the testimony at trial, 
the trial court found her claimed necessary expenses of $2,200 to be "very modest" and "maybe 
a little unrealistic". (R. at 47). 
Mr. Crompton, in contrast, drives a 1992 Nissan Pathfinder motor vehicle. 
(Defendant's Exhibit 10). He also went on numerous trips during the first part of 1993. (T. at 
71-72). He lives with a female companion and the parties' adult daughter Tiffany. Both the 
female companion and Tiffany are employed and share in Mr. Crompton's household expenses. 
(T. at 57). 
At trial, Mr. Crompton claimed that his monthly expenses were $3,177.00 but 
acknowledged under questioning by his attorney that his employed adult daughter and his female 
companion can contribute "a third or more" to those listed expenses. (T. at 57). He admitted 
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on cross-examination that his female companion contributes "about a thousand dollars" towards 
his monthly expenses. (T. at 68). He further acknowledged that his companion shared in 
paying for his claimed rent, groceries and utility expenses. (T. at 69). In addition, he admitted 
that he would no longer have his $100 monthly expense for non-covered medical expenses once 
he paid off an outstanding $500 medical bill. (T. at 70). In light of this testimony, the trial 
court reasonably deducted $1,200 from his total amount of expenses and attributed necessary 
expenses to him in the amount of $1,972.00 per month. The trial court based its decision on 
what was reasonable to be spent for only Mr. Crompton and "not the other people that are living 
with him." (R. at 47.) 
With respect to the division of property and debts, the parties stipulated to the 
division of personal property and both parties submitted lists valuing the property. Very little 
testimony was given with respect to the values of the property. However, upon cross 
examination Mr. Crompton acknowledged that he did not want the property in Mrs. Crompton's 
possession if he was required to pay the value that he had placed upon it. (T. at 82). According 
to Mrs. Crompton's valuation of the personal property, she received property worth 
approximately $1,200 more than the property distributed to Mr. Crompton. However, the 
testimony at trial indicated that Mr. Crompton had received certain tools which were quite 
expensive that had been omitted from Mrs. Crompton's list of property. (T. at 56). Mr. 
Crompton sought a greater portion of the cash proceeds from the sale of the parties' home to 
adjust for what he perceived to be the difference in value in the personal property. Mr. 
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Crompton also objected to the court's determination that he was responsible for paying the debt 
to Avco in the amount of $1,682.00. 
In its ruling, the trial court considered the fact that Mr. Crompton had received 
certain tools, which were omitted from the schedule of personal property. (R. at 51.) In light 
of the evidence presented by the parties with respect to the value of the personal property, the 
trial court simply accepted the division of the personal property stipulated to by the parties 
without requiring any adjustment in the home equity funds. (R. at 51). In addition to noting 
that Mr. Crompton received the tools that were not included on the schedule of property, the 
trial court noted that Mr. Crompton was in a much better position than Mrs. Crompton to 
replace the items of property that were distributed to the other party. (R. at 51). The court 
stated: 
I suspect that he'll work more than the overtime I have identified, 
and when he does, he's making a good wage at time and a half and 
sometimes double time. I suspect that if she were to go out and 
get a second job to try and replace some of these things, it would 
not be much of an income, so just weighing everything, I'm just 
going to award those items of personal property that have been 
identified in the schedules. 
(R. at 51). The trial court awarded the cash proceeds from the sale of the marital home that 
remained after the payment of the parties' marital debts to be divided equally between them. 
Mr. Crompton then appealed the trial court's award of alimony to Mrs. Crompton 
in the amount of $1,100.00 per month. He further appealed the trial court's refusal to award 
him a larger portion of the cash proceeds from the sale of the marital home. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The parties to this matter were married for a period of twenty-five (25) years. 
Both of the parties worked during the marriage, but earned vastly different incomes. All 
relevant evidence presented at trial indicated that the defendant earned an average of 
approximately $57,000 more per year than the plaintiff. However, the defendant was able to 
obtain his high salary only through working substantial amounts of overtime and by working 
Sundays and holidays as part of his regular work shift which paid a double wage. 
Approximately 50 percent of the defendant's income resulted from overtime or shift-differential 
work. The uncontested evidence indicated that the defendant consistently worked 20 to 30 
hours per week in overtime over the last five to eight years. 
In fashioning a monthly alimony award to plaintiff in the amount of $1,100, the 
trial court appropriately made factual findings concerning the plaintiff's needs, her ability to 
provide support for herself, and the defendant's ability to contribute to the plaintiffs needs. 
Each of the court's findings was substantially supported by credible evidence presented at trial. 
The trial court's decision to base the alimony award on only one-half of the 
defendant's actual overtime income represented a reasonable approach to providing for the needs 
of the plaintiff without unduly penalizing the defendant for his extra efforts. This approach 
taken by the trial court is fully consistent with a substantial majority of cases that have 
considered the issue. Regular, consistent, predictable overtime received over a long time period 
is properly subject to inclusion in an alimony award. 
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Moreover, the trial court's failure to consider the defendant's shift-differential pay 
in its calculations relieves the defendant from working approximately 5 hours a week in 
overtime. The court's failure to calculate the alimony award based on pre-tax income will also 
result in a reduction of overtime of approximately 2 hours per week for the plaintiff to meet his 
needs and obligations. In short, the plaintiff actually need only work overtime of approximately 
8 hours per week in order to meet his support obligations. 
Finally, the trial court's refusal to grant the defendant a larger portion of the cash 
proceeds from the sale of the marital home did not constitute a clear abuse of discretion. In 
light of the dearth of evidence presented at trial regarding the valuation of personal property, 
the length of the parties' marriage and the differences in the parties' incomes, the trial court was 
fully within its discretion to refuse to give defendant a larger cash settlement than plaintiff. 
Accordingly, the trial court's Decree of Divorce granting plaintiff alimony in the amount of 
$1,100 per month and equitably dividing the marital estate should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF $1,100 PER MONTH IN 
ALIMONY TO MRS. CROMPTON WAS APPROPRIATE 
IN LIGHT OF THE PARTIES' 25 YEAR MARRIAGE 
AND THE $57,000 DIFFERENCE IN THEIR ANNUAL INCOMES. 
The purpose of alimony is to "enable the receiving spouse to maintain as nearly 
as possible the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage and to prevent the spouse from 
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becoming a public charge." Paffel v. PaffeL 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986); Naranio v. 
Naranio. 751 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). "It should, so far as possible, equalize 
the parties' respective standard of living and maintain them at a level as close a possible to the 
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage." Naranjo, 751 P.2d at 1146-47 (Empahsis 
added). "The ultimate test of the propriety of an alimony award is whether, given all of these 
factors, the party receiving alimony will be able to support him- or herself as nearly as possible 
at the standard of living ... enjoyed during the marriage'". Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647 649 
(Utah 1988) quoting English v. English 565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977). 
The above pronouncements from Utah appellate courts have particular application 
to the present case because of the substantial length of the parties' marriage and the huge 
difference in the parties' incomes, both historically and at the time of trial. The Defendant, 
through this appeal, seeks to eviscerate existing Utah law pertaining to the equalization of 
parties' post-divorce standard of living. He attempts to accomplish this by claiming as his own 
all income that he obtains through overtime or shift-differential pay, even though he has received 
such overtime and shift-differential pay as part of his regular employment throughout the 
marriage. As set forth below, the trial court's award of alimony to the Defendant was 
appropriate and just and fully comports with case law from Utah and the majority of other 
jurisdictions. 
A. The evidence supported the trial court's factual findings in support of the 
alimony award. In determining the amount of alimony, a trial court must consider three 
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factors: (1) the financial condition and needs of the party seeking alimony; (2) the ability of the 
receiving spouse to produce sufficient income for him- or herself; and (3) the ability of the 
responding spouse to provide support. Jones v. Jones. 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985). In 
the present case, the trial court explicitly considered the three factors enunciated in Jones and 
made appropriate factual findings with respect to them. The trial court further followed the 
mandate set forth in Paffel and Davis by providing for the needs of the wife in a reasonable 
manner. 
With respect to the first factor, Mrs. Crompton's needs, the trial court specifically 
found in Finding No. 14. that Mrs. Crompton's reasonable living expenses were $2,200 per 
month, an amount the trial court considered "modest and perhaps unrealistically low." (R. at 60-
61). This finding was supported both by Mrs. Crompton's testimony at trial regarding her needs 
(R. at 19-26) and the uncontested evidence that the parties enjoyed a standard of living during 
the marriage that involved totally spending their combined gross annual incomes of 
approximately $78,000. It is unclear whether Mr. Crompton is appealing from this finding. 
He asserts that Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2 claimed only necessary expenses in the amount of 
$2,100.00. However, based on the evidence at trial, the trial court still considered the $2,200 
as "unrealistically low." (R. at 47). 
Mr. Crompton also asserts that Mrs. Crompton was not entitled to claim $100 per 
month for her gas and car maintenance if she also claimed $200 for a car payment to purchase 
a new vehicle. This assertion is particularly offensive in light of Mr. Crompton's assertion in 
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Exhibit 10 that he needed $357 for his lease payment on his nearly new 1992 Nissan Pathfinder, 
as well as an additional $130 for oil, gas and repairs. Judge Lyon was fully within his 
discretion to accept Mrs. Crompton's anticipated expense of approximately $200 per month to 
purchase a newer vehicle and her expense of over $100 per month for automobile gas and 
maintenance. Accordingly, sufficient evidence supported the trial court's finding that Mrs. 
Crompton's needs were approximately $2,200.00 per month. 
In analyzing the second factor set forth in Jones, Mrs. Crompton's ability to 
provide for herself, the trial court found in Finding of Fact No. 10 that Mrs. Crompton was 
employed at Mervyns "and earns a gross monthly income of $1,343.00, with a monthly net of 
$1,003.00." (R. at 60). Mr. Crompton apparently appeals from this finding on the basis that 
the trial court failed to include in Mrs. Crompton's income "a dollar or so" per hour raise in the 
event she is ever promoted. Mrs. Crompton had indicated that this amount would be the most 
that she could ever hope to earn, given her limited education. (T. at 11). There was absolutely 
no evidence presented that she was capable of earning that amount at the time of trial. Plaintiff 
is unaware of any case law that requires the trial court to base the receiving spouse's income on 
such speculative income that may or may not occur in the distant future. 
Mr. Crompton further claims that the trial court erred because it allowed Mrs. 
Crompton to take certain optional deductions from her pay which Mr. Crompton asserts should 
have been added back in. These deductions were for additional life insurance totalling less than 
$2.50 per month, a United Way donation, also amounting to less than $2.50 a month, health 
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insurance for Plaintiff in the amount of $45.50 per month, and a pre-tax retirement deduction 
benefit in the amount of $27.00 per month. If these amounts are deducted along with the Mrs. 
Crompton's tax deductions, the Plaintiff has a net income of approximately $1,007.00 per 
month. The $1,003.00 on Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 2 and carried over to Finding of Fact No. 10 
(R. at 61) was likely a mathematical error, but would result in only a $4.00 per month 
difference.1 
Incredibly, Mr. Crompton asserts that Mrs. Crompton should not be entitled to 
claim any of the optional deductions, including her health insurance. It should be emphasized 
that Mrs. Crompton did not include her health insurance expense in her list of necessary 
expenses. The $50.00 included in the Plaintiffs Exhibit 2 for medical and dental were for 
uninsured medical expenses. (T. at 37-38). Whether the optional deductions were included as 
necessary expenses and subtracted from Mrs. Crompton's after-tax income or simply taken as 
a paycheck deduction matters little. The trial court was fully within its discretion to allow the 
optional deductions from Mrs. Crompton's pay check in determining her net income, particularly 
in light of the standard of living enjoyed by the parties during the marriage. Therefore, Finding 
No. 10 is fully supported by the applicable evidence and the second Jones criterion was satisfied. 
The trial court's findings that Mrs. Crompton needed approximately $2,200 for her reasonable 
1
 The computations were made by multiplying the deductions on Plaintiffs bi-weekly 
paycheck by 26 and dividing them by 12. See Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. 
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expenses yet could provide only approximately $1,000 per month certainly justifies an alimony 
award of at least $1,100 per month. 
The final Jones factor, Mr. Crompton's ability to provide support to Mrs. 
Crompton, was also fully explained by the trial court and supported by the evidence presented 
at trial. This factor implicitly required the lower court to make findings regarding both Mr. 
Crompton's income and his needs in order to compute the amount that would be available for 
him to contribute to Mrs. Crompton's necessary expenses. 
In Finding of Fact No. 16, the lower court found Mr. Crompton's reasonable 
expenses to be $1,972.00 per month, which represented "the expenses of the Defendant alone, 
not calculating the expenses of others in his home." (R. at 61). The Defendant attacks this 
finding as lacking support in the record. However, the Defendant caused the difficulty in 
determining his monthly expenses because he presented no credible evidence that accurately 
portrayed the amount of his reasonable expenses. 
All exhibits presented by him that related to his expenses included amounts for 
other adults living in his home that were also employed full time and contributing to the 
expenses. On direct examination, he indicated that "a third or more" of his necessary expenses 
were paid by his adult daughter or female companion. (T. at 57.) He admitted on cross-
examination that his female companion contributes about $1,000.00 to his necessary expenses. 
(T. at 68). He also indicated that he would no longer have $100.00 per month in medical 
expenses when he paid off a $500 medical bill. (T. at 70). 
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It is noteworthy that Defendant does not suggest to this Court how the trial court 
should have defined the amount of his monthly needs or otherwise specify how his expenses 
could have been determined from the evidence. Rather, he conveniently criticizes the trial judge 
for failing to adduce the amount of his needs. 
Given the vague nature of the evidence presented by Defendant with respect to 
his living expenses and his testimony that a third or more of his list of necessary expenses could 
be contributed by those living him, the trial court was fully within its discretion to subtract 
approximately $1,200 from his listed expenses and conclude the Defendant's reasonable expenses 
were $1,972.00. 
Moreover, the expenses attributed to the Defendant are actually very generous 
when compared with the Plaintiff's expenses. The Defendant, though sharing his rent, 
household expenses, and utilities with two adults who are employed full time, has necessary 
expenses only $228 dollars less than Plaintiff, who lives with her minor daughter still attending 
high school. In light of these differing living arrangements, and this Court's mandate in Naranio 
that the parties standard of living should be equalized to the extent possible, the trial court's 
calculation of the Defendant's reasonable living expenses appears to be more than ample and did 
not constitute an abuse of discretion. 
The trial court also made specific findings with respect to Mr. Crompton's 
earnings. In Finding of Fact No. 12, the trial court found that Mr. Crompton's historical 
income "had been in the $60,000 to $70,000 range per year." (R. at 60). Mr. Crompton admits 
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that his historical annual income for the four year period between 1989 and 1992 averaged 
$67,776.00. (Appellant's brief at 6). Mr. Crompton further acknowledges that at the time of 
trial, Mr. Crompton was earning a substantial income, having earned $50,806.34 through 
September 12, 1993. Id At that rate, he would have earned in excess of $72,700 by the end 
of 1993. Even assuming that Mr. Crompton was in a 35% tax bracket, he would still have a 
monthly net income of $2,937.92 to apply to his necessary expenses after paying the Plaintiff 
alimony and child support. These calculations are illustrated as follows: 
Defendant's annual income $72,700 
Defendant's monthly income 6,058 
Alimony to Plaintiff 1,100 
Gross income subject to taxes 4,958 
Taxes @ 35 percent rate 1,735 
Net Income before child support 3,223 
Child Support paid to Plaintiff 285 
Net amount available to Defendant $2,938 
According to the uncontested evidence presented at trial, the average difference in the parties' 
incomes in the five year period between 1989 and the date of trial in 1993 was approximately 
$57,000 each year! 
If only the above evidence is considered, the Defendant obviously was earning 
sufficient income at the time of trial to pay alimony to Plaintiff in the amount of $1,100 per 
month for her necessary expenses. The trial court's factual findings would be sufficiently 
specific and supported by the evidence to more than justify an award of $1,100 per month in 
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alimony. However, because the Defendant asserted that approximately 50 percent of his current 
and historical earnings resulted from overtime and shift-differential pay, the trial court entered 
additional findings. 
The trial court found in Finding No. 11 that Mr. Crompton is paid a base rate of 
$1,458 ($3,159 per month) at Kimberly-Clark and had historically worked 20-30 hours per week 
in overtime. The court further found that it was likely that the Defendant would continue to 
work overtime. (R. at 60). The court also found in Finding No. 12 that it would be 
unreasonable to expect him to work 20 to 30 hours a week overtime to support a failed 
marriage. (R. at 60). The court determined in Finding No. 14, however, that the Defendant 
could reasonably work 55 hours a week, and, in Finding No. 18, imputed an income to him of 
$4,935.00 per month. (R. at 60-61). Mr. Crompton's double salary for shift-differential work 
was not included in the court's calculation of his imputed income. 
The Defendant apparently does not contest the court's finding that he had 
historically worked 20 to 30 hours per week in overtime. He contests only, as a matter of law, 
the court's discretion to attribute an alimony award that contemplates he will continue working 
15 hours per week in alimony. He apparently asserts that the court may not make an alimony 
award based on his overtime or shift-differential pay, and that the court is constrained to fashion 
an award of alimony in light of his regular salary. The only issue before this Court, then, is 
whether the trial court erred in considering Mr. Crompton's continuing history of overtime work 
in establishing an award of alimony. The overwhelming weight of authority has adopted the 
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viewpoint that the inclusion of such overtime is proper. Before examining those authorities, 
however, it is important to point out that Mr. Crompton need not work 15 hours a week in 
overtime in order to meet the income imputed to him by the lower court. 
B. The Defendant will actually need to work far less than 15 hours per week 
overtime to meet his needs and the needs of Plaintiff because the trial court neglected to consider 
Defendant's shift-differential pay and also failed to consider the tax consequences of alimony. 
Mr. Crompton received one-and-a-half times his hourly rate for overtime, but he also received 
double his hourly rate for working on Sundays. Mr. Crompton made it very clear that his 
double time pay for Sunday work was not overtime but actually shift-differential pay for working 
on Sundays as part of his normal 40 hour week. (T. at 74). In 1993, Mr. Crompton's shift-
differential pay for working on Sundays and holidays was approximately equal to the amount that 
he was paid in overtime, both totalling approximately $11,100. (T. at 74; Plaintiffs Exhibit 3). 
The trial court apparently failed to calculate any shift-differential pay for the Defendant when 
imputing income to him.2 
Even assuming the Plaintiff worked only one double-pay day per week (i.e., 
Sunday or a holiday) as part of his regular work week, the extra $145.76 that the Defendant 
would earn would reduce his weekly overtime burden by 5.33 hours ($145.76 / $27.34 = 5.33). 
2
 The trial court apparently multiplied the Defendant's hourly wage of $18.22 times 1.5 to 
obtain an overtime rate of $27.34. By adding the products of $18.22 x 40 = $728.80 and 
$27.34 x 15 = $410.03, the court reached a weekly wage for Defendant of $1,158.83. On a 
monthly basis this equals $4,935.00. 
m 
In light of the very significant amount of the Defendant's double-pay shown in Plaintiff's Exhibit 
3 and admitted to by the Defendant (T. at 74), a single day per week in shift-differential pay 
appears to be quite conservative. If this shift-differential work is not considered, the Plaintiff, 
in essence, receives a very substantial windfall during his 40 hour work week which is not 
accounted for in determining the amount of his necessary overtime. 
In addition, the trial court apparently based its overtime calculations by assuming 
that the Defendant is in a 35 percent tax bracket and then deducting his alimony payment from 
his after-tax income. (R. 47-48). If the court had made its computations based on the fact that 
alimony is taxed to the recipient and not the payor, the Defendant would be required to work 
less overtime hours. This is illustrated as follows: 
Defendant's monthly income $4,935 
Alimony to Plaintiff 1,100 
Gross income subject to taxes 3,835 
Taxes @ 35 percent rate 1.342 
Net Income before child support 2,493 
Child Support paid to Plaintiff 285 
Net amount available to Defendant 2,208 
Amount of defendant's needs 1.972 
Excess funds available to Defendant $ 236 
By dividing the excess funds of $236 available to the Defendant by his overtime rate of $27.34, 
the Defendant can eliminate 8.63 overtime hours per month, or an additional two hours each 
week, and still meet his needs and obligations. 
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If the effect of the Defendant's double-pay for shift work and the tax consequences 
of alimony are both taken into consideration, the Defendant actually need only work 7.67 hours 
overtime per week to support himself and the Defendant. The trial court in reality imputed only 
a 47.67 hour work week to the Defendant for him to meet his alimony obligation to Plaintiff and 
his own reasonable expenses. In light of the Defendant's admitted historical overtime of 20 to 
30 hours per week, the trial court's actual imputation of 7.67 hours in overtime to the Defendant 
was reasonable and conservative. 
C. An award of alimony based on the Defendant's current and historical overtime 
earnings is appropriate, just and supported by the weight of authorities that have considered the 
issue. It appears that the issue of the inclusion of overtime in the payor spouse's income to 
determine alimony is an issue of first impression in Utah. This Court, however, has recently 
allowed the inclusion of the father's overtime in determining his gross income for purposes of 
child support. In Hurt v. Hurt. 793 P.2d 948, (Utah Ct. App. 1990), the father argued that the 
trial court should not have considered his history of rather large overtime wages in determining 
the amount of his child support obligation. The father claimed that the trial court should have 
foreseen that the amount of his overtime would decline in the future. The trial court, however, 
expressly decided to consider modifying the amount of child support only if in fact the father's 
overtime hours declined. This Court held that the trial court "did not err in taking this wait-and-
see approach to the facts underlying its child support calculations." Id at 950. The holding 
in Hurt implicitly recognizes that overtime income may appropriately be included in a father's 
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income for purposes of determining child support. If such income may be included in a father's 
income for purposes of determining child support, it similarly should be included in income for 
alimony determination purposes. 
The Hurt decision is consistent with the approach taken by the vast majority of 
other jurisdictions that have looked at the issue of including overtime income in the context of 
alimony. The West Virginia Supreme Court recently considered this issue in Rexroad v. 
Rexroad, 414 S.E.2d 457 (W.Va. 1992). There, the husband claimed that he earned $32,000 
a year in base pay and $42,000 per year with overtime. The husband testified that he regularly 
worked in excess of 40 hours a week. The wife earned approximately $10,000 per year working 
as a sales clerk for Sears. In overruling the trial court's failure to include the husband's 
overtime earnings in calculating the alimony award to the wife, the court in Rexroad held that 
"in determining the amount of alimony or child support that may be obtained, consideration may 
be given not only to regular wages earned, but also to the amount of overtime pay ordinarily 
obtained." IcL at 460. 
The Rexroad court specifically relied on the case of Jones v. Jones, 472 N.W.2d 
782 (S.D. 1991) where the husband had worked an average of ten hours per week overtime for 
two years. The South Dakota Supreme Court upheld the trial court's inclusion of this overtime 
income in considering child support payments, and specifically noted the distinction "between 
consistent overtime pay and speculative overtime pay." Id. at 784. 
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Similarly, in In re Marriage of Vashler. 600 P.2d 208, 212 (Mont. 1979), the 
Montana Supreme Court held that it was not error for the trial court to consider the husband's 
overtime pay in alimony and child support orders. In Vashler. the trial court had found that the 
husband averaged about 4 hours per week in overtime for which he received increased 
compensation. The lower court included that increased amount in the husband's gross income 
for purposes of determining child support and spousal maintenance. In upholding the inclusion, 
the Montana Supreme Court noted: 
there is uncontested evidence that the husband 
averaged five hours a week overtime for the full 
year of 1977 and that he averaged six to seven 
hours of overtime from January 1, 1978 through 
May, 1978. ... We cannot say that the District 
Court's disposition of this case was arbitrary, 
without employment of conscientious judgment, or 
exceeded the bounds of reason in view of all of the 
circumstances. Id. (citations omitted). 
In In re Marriage of Elbert. 492 N.W.2d 733 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992), the Iowa 
Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's award of alimony based on the husband's overtime 
income. The Iowa court held that such income was appropriately considered because it had 
remained consistent over the past five years and nothing indicated that his overtime would 
decline in the future. Similarly, in Stuczvnski v. Stuczvnski, 471 N.W. 2d 122, the Nebraska 
Supreme Court held that it is "appropriate to consider overtime wages in setting child support 
and alimony payments if the overtime is a regular part of the employment and the employee can 
actually expect to earn a certain amount of income for working overtime." Id. at 126. 
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In short, all of the above cases have upheld the inclusion of overtime in support 
awards if the overtime is a regular, predictable occurrence. This approach is consistent with the 
decisions of nearly all jurisdictions relating to this issue. See Annotation, Consideration of 
Obligated Spouses Earnings From Overtime or "Second Job" Held in Addition to Regular Full-
Time Employment in Fixing Alimony or Child Support Awards, 17 A.L.R. 5th 143, §§ 6-7, 
(1994) and cases cited therein. 
The above criteria for awarding alimony fits closely with the facts in the present 
case. The Defendant's income has been regular, consistent and predictable for a period of 
approximately 8 years. Indeed, the Defendant was continuing to work significant overtime hours 
through the time of trial. The Defendant's overtime is related to his regular employment and 
he can reasonably expect to receive his past overtime on an ongoing basis. Therefore, applying 
the rationale of the above cases, the Defendant's current and historical overtime were 
appropriately included in his income for purposes of alimony determination. 
Notably, even a case relied upon by Defendant, In re Marriage of Smith, 274 Cal. 
Rptr. 911 (Cal. Ct. App. 1 Dist. 1990), stands for the proposition that overtime should be 
appropriately included in determining spousal support. In footnote 15, the court in Smith states 
as follows: 
We do not mean to suggest that income from 
overtime work, or from a second job should be 
disregarded in determining spousal support, either 
initially or upon modification. ... Upon the breakup 
of the marriage, the trial court, in its discretion, 
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may find it necessary to make an order which gives 
the supported spouse a smaller percentage of the 
supporting spouse's overtime or second job pay than 
is ordered from other base pay, in order to provide 
the supporting spouse with the incentive to continue 
to work more than the law would require. IcL at 
925. 
This is precisely the solution that the trial judge attempted to fashion in the present 
case. The trial judge allocated only a portion of the Defendant's traditional overtime income. 
If the Defendant continued to work at the rate he had worked during the last 8 years, the 
Defendant would receive a much greater benefit from the overtime hours than would Plaintiff. 
Accordingly, the trial court's award of alimony is appropriate even under the guidelines set forth 
in Smith. 
Finally, the Defendant's reliance on the case of In re Simpson. 841 P. 2d 931 (Cal. 
1992), is misplaced. The facts of Simpson are substantially different from the case at bar in two 
respects. First, in Simpson, the husband was not working overtime, but, rather was working 
a second full time job. The husband literally had been working an average of 16 hours a day 
and the trial court's award of alimony was based on such earning capacity. IcL at 933. In the 
present case, conversely, the trial court presumed the Defendant's overtime to be only two to 
three hours a day. This presumption was approximately half of the Defendant's actual current 
and historical overtime hours. 
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Second, the Simpson decision was based upon the lower court's finding with 
respect to the husband's earning capacity, rather than his actual earnings, because he had quit 
his second job several months prior to trial. IdL at 932. In contrast, the present Defendant was 
actually earning substantial overtime through the time of trial. These factual differences 
emphasize the reasonableness of the trial court's approach in the present case. The Defendant's 
overtime was considered, but only at a fraction of its actual amount. 
In conclusion, Judge Lyon's decision to award alimony based on a portion of the 
Defendant's acutal overtime constitutes an appropriate method of including overtime in an 
alimony determination. It provides Mrs. Crompton with some benefit from Mr. Crompton's 
overtime earnings, but still affords Mr. Crompton sufficient opportunity to earn significant 
earnings for himself based upon his past overtime performance. The decision fully comports 
with the pronouncements of courts from the various jurisdictions that have examined the issue. 
Accordingly, the trial court's award of alimony to Mrs. Crompton in the amount of $1,100 
should be affirmed. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT A CLEAR ABUSE 
OF DISCRETION OR CAUSE MANIFEST INJUSTICE BY 
REFUSING TO AWARD TO THE DEFENDANT A GREATER 
PORTION OF FUNDS FROM THE SALE OF THE PARTIES' 
MARITAL HOME, 
The trial court in a divorce action has considerable discretion in adjusting the 
financial and property interests of the parties, and such a distribution is presumed to be valid. 
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Accordingly, appellate courts will not disturb a trial court's distribution unless it is clearly unjust 
or a clear abuse of discretion. Rasband v. Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). In 
the present case, the Defendant seeks to overturn the lower court's decision dividing property 
and debt and obtain a larger portion of the funds received from the sale of the parties' home. 
As fully set forth above in Plaintiff's discussion of the facts, the trial court 
awarded Mrs. Crompton personal property with a value of approximately $1,200.00 greater 
than Mr. Crompton's personal property, excluding his tools, which her testimony indicated were 
quite expensive. (T. at 32). Mr. Crompton sought a greater portion of the cash proceeds from 
the sale of the parties' home to adjust for what he perceived to be the difference in value in the 
personal property. The trial court pointed to the lack of evidence presented by the parties with 
respect to the value of the personal property and accepted the division of the personal property 
stipulated to by the parties without requiring any adjustment in the home equity funds. (R. at 
51). In light of Mr. Crompton's testimony that he did not want the property in Mrs. 
Crompton's possession if he was required to pay the value that he had placed upon it, the trial 
court was completely justified in accepting her values. (T. at 82). Moreover, if the value of 
the tools in Mr. Crompton's possession was substantial, Mr. Crompton's perceived difference 
in the personal property may not have existed at all. Accordingly, the tiial court was fully 
justified in equally dividing the funds from the sale of the marital home. 
Similarly, the trial court was well within its discretion when it determined that 
Mr. Crompton likely would have a higher wage and could more easily replace the items of 
26 
personal property provided to the other party than Mrs. Crompton. Considering the $57,000 
difference in the parties' current and historical incomes, and the modest amount of alimony to 
Mrs. Crompton, it was not a clear abuse of discretion to award Mrs. Crompton a slightly higher 
value of personal property. 
The same rationale applies to the court's judgment that Mr. Crompton pay for the 
Avco debt in the amount of $1,682.00. Mrs. Crompton was required to pay the America First 
Credit Union, Mervyns, and Li'l Audreys debts. When her debts are considered, again in light 
of the difference in the parties' historical and present incomes, the trial court was well within 
its discretion to require the Defendant to pay the Avco debt. The trial court was completely 
within its discretion to allocate the division of assets and debts as it did and to refuse to grant 
to the Defendant a greater portion in the funds from the sale of the marital home. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in fashioning an award of alimony in 
favor of plaintiff in the amount of $1,100 per month. The court considered all appropriate 
factors and followed the dictates of relevant case law. The court's determination to consider 
only about half of the defendant's actual overtime income for purposes of determining alimony 
represents a reasonable solution to the problems created by overtime work. Moreover, it would 
be manifestly unjust to deprive the wife of a 25 year marriage, who possesses limited earning 
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potential, from receiving the benefits of the income that her husband had historically earned 
during the marriage. 
Similarly, the trial court's division of property constituted a fair and equitable 
division of the parties' debts and assets. The lower court did not commit a clear abuse of 
discretion or cause any manifest injustice to occur. Accordingly, plaintiff respectfully requests 
this Court to affirm the ruling of the trial court in all its respects. 
DATED this T ^ a y of April, 1994. 
DOUGLASU THOMAS 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
APPELLEE'S REPLY BRIEF, this V^fray of April, 1994, to the following: 
Brian R. Florence, Esq. 
FLORENCE AND HUTCHISON 
818-26th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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ADDENDUM 
A copy of Trial Court's October 27, 1993 Bench Ruling. 
A copy of Trial Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
A copy of Decree of Divorce. 
A copy of Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 (Mrs. Crompton's pay check). 
A copy of Plaintiffs Exhibit 3 (Mr. Crompton's income information). 
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1. A COPY OF TRIAL COURT'S OCTOBER 27, 1993 BENCH RULING. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH ; ': » — 
***** 
VICKIE L. CROMPTON, 
PLAINTIFF, 
VS. 
CLIFFORD B. CROMPTON, 
DEFENDANT. 
'S3f!C» 1 f.P, 7 05 
NOV 0 21993 
RULING 
CASE NO. 924902496 
***** 
BE IT REMEMBERED THAT THIS MATTER CAME ON REGULARLY FOR 
HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL D. LYON, JUDGE, SITTING 
AT OGDEN, UTAH ON THE 27TH DAY OF OCTOBER 1993. 
WHEREUPON THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD, TO WIT: 
***** 
APPEARANCES: 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: DAVID R. HAMILTON 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: BRIAN R. FLORENCE 
***** 
REPORTED BY DEAN OLSEN, CSR 
847 E. 2800 N. 
NORTH OGDEN, UTAH 84414 
WK. 399-8405 HM. 782-3146 
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1 OGDEN, UTAH OCTOBER 27. 1993 10; 15 A.M. 
2 THE COURT: GOOD MORNING, GENTLEMEN. LET ME PUT YOU 
3 ON THE SPEAKER PHONE PLEASE. CAN YOU BOTH HEAR OKAY? 
4
 MR. FLORENCE: YES. 
5 THE COURT:- ALL RIGHT. THIS IS THE TIME SET FOR 
6 DECISION IN THE MATTER OF CROMPTON VERSUS CROMPTON. RECORD 
7 SHOULD SHOW THAT I'M IN CHAMBERS WITH MY CLERK AND COURT 
8 REPORTER AND THAT I HAVE ON THE TELEPHONE — ON THE TELEPHONE 
9 CONFERENCE DAVID HAMILTON REPRESENTING THE PLAINTIFF AND BRYAN 
10 FLORENCE REPRESENTING THE DEFENDANT. 
11 COURT MAKES THE FOLLOWING FINDINGS OF FACT AND RULINGS: 
12 THE PLAINTIFF IS A BONA FIDE RESIDENT OF WEBER COUNTY AND WAS 
13 SO FOR THREE MONTHS NEXT PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THIS DIVORCE 
14 ACTION. THE PARTIES WERE MARRIED ON DECEMBER 8, 1990 — 1967 
15 IN SALT LAKE CITY. TWO CHILDREN WERE BORN AS ISSUE OF THIS 
16 MARRIAGE, BUT ONLY ONE IS A MINOR. HER NAME IS KIMBERLY, AND 
17 SHE IS 17. AND SHE WILL GRADUATE FROM HIGH SCHOOL AND REACH 
18
 HER MAJORITY IN JUNE OF 1994. 
19
 THE PARTIES HAVE STIPULATED THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS A FIT 
20
 AND PROPER PERSON TO BE AWARDED THE CUSTODY OF THE PARTIES' 
21 MINOR CHILD, SUBJECT TO STANDARD VISITATION BY THE DEFENDANT. 
22
 AND THE COURT WILL ORDER THAT. 
23 COURT FINDS THAT THERE ARE IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES 
24 RENDERING THE MARRIAGE IRREMEDIABLY BROKEN. THE PLAINTIFF IS 
25
 AWARDED A DECREE OF DIVORCE. 
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1
 MR. FLORENCE, DID YOU — HAS YOUR CLIENT FILED A 
2
 COUNTERCLAIM? 
3 MR. FLORENCE: I DON'T BELIEVE SO, YOUR HONOR. 
4
 THE COURT: I DIDN'T RECALL THAT, BUT IT OCCURRED TO 
5 ME THAT I DIDN'T CHECK THE FILE ON THAT. 
6
 MR. FLORENCE: I DON'T THINK WE'RE ASKING FOR A DIVORCE. 
7 THE COURT: OKAY. THEN THE PLAINTIFF IS AWARDED A 
8 DECREE OF DIVORCE ON THE GROUNDS OF IRRECONCILABLE 
9 DIFFERENCES. 
10 THE COURT HAS ACCEPTED THE STIPULATION BY THE PARTIES 
11 RESPECTING MANY OF THE ISSUES EXCEPT THE ONES THAT WERE TRIED, 
12 AND THE. COURT APPROVES THAT STIPULATION, AND INCLUDING THE 
13 AWARD' OF CHILD SUPPORT AS AGREED UPON BY THE PARTIES. 
14 MR. HAMILTON, YOU'LL NEED TO FILE A WORKSHEET FOR THE 
15 FILE, HOWEVER. 
16 MR. HAMILTON: OKAY. 
17 || THE COURT: COURT FINDS THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS EMPLOYED 
AT MERVYN'S IN OGDEN AND EARNS MONTHLY INCOME OF $134 3 WITH A 
19
 || NET INCOME OF APPROXIMATELY $1003. 
20
 THE DEFENDANT IS EMPLOYED AS AN ELECTRICIAN AT KIMBERLY-
21 CLARK WHERE HE HAS BEEN EMPLOYED FOR EIGHT YEARS. HIS BASE 
22
 PAY IS APPROXIMATELY $1458 EVERY TWO WEEKS. HE ALSO WORKS 
23 SUBSTANTIAL OVERTIME EVERY WEEK, AND HAS EVEN IN TIMES PAST 
24
 WORKED ON HIS DAYS OFF TO HELP RETIRE FAMILY DEBT. ALTHOUGH 
25
 OVERTIME IS NOT GUARANTEED OR REQUIRED AS PART OF HIS 
18 
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1 EMPLOYMENT, COURT FINDS THAT HISTORICALLY HE HAS WORKED 2 0 TO 
2 30 HOURS A WEEK OVERTIME INCLUDING IN SOME INSTANCES DOUBLE 
3 OVERTIME ON SUNDAYS. 
4 COURT FINDS THAT IT'S LIKELY THAT HE WILL CONTINUE TO 
5 WORK OVERTIME TO SATISFY THE LIFESTYLE THAT HE HAS DEVELOPED 
6 OVER THE YEARS. COURT IN FIXING HIS INCOME FOR ALIMONY 
7 PURPOSES HAS LOOKED AT HIS HISTORICAL INCOME WHICH RANGES 
8 SOMEWHERE IN THE LOW SIXTIES TO THE LOW 70,000 RANGE EACH 
9 YEAR. HOWEVER, THE COURT FINDS THAT IT'S NOT REASONABLE TO 
10 EXPECT HIM TO WORK THESE KIND OF HOURS FOR A FAILED MARRIAGE. 
11 IN OTHER WORDS, OFTEN A HUSBAND MAY SACRIFICE AND WORK WHAT 
12 THE COURT WOULD DEEM UNREASONABLE HOURS TO TAKE CARE OF HIS 
13 FAMILY AND MEET THE LIFESTYLE AND OBLIGATIONS THAT THE — THAT 
14 THE FAMILY MAY HAVE ACQUIRED. BUT THAT IN A DIVORCE, IT'S 
15 UNREASONABLE TO EXPECT HIM TO CONTINUE TO DO THAT, AND 
16 THEREFORE, THE COURT WILL NOT £PPLY HISTORICAL INCOME FOR THE 
17 PURPOSES OF COMPUTING ALIMONY. INSTEAD, THE COURT WILL IMPUTE 
18 TO HIM WHAT MIGHT BE CALLED A REASONABLE OR INCOME FROM A 
19 REASONABLE WORK ETHIC. I THINK MOST OF US WORK MORE THAN 40 
20 HOURS A WEEK AND WHERE HE HAS HISTORICALLY WORKED MORE THAN 4 0 
21 HOURS A WEEK THE COURT WILL APPLY A REASONABLE WORK ETHIC TO 
22 HIM AND THE COURT HAS JUDGED THAT TO BE SOMEWHERE BETWEEN 50 
23 TO 55 HOURS, AND IN THIS CASE, WILL USE SOMEWHERE AROUND 55 
24 HOURS AS THE HOURS THAT HE WOULD REASONABLY BE EXPECTED TO 
25 PROVIDE FOR HIS WIFE SO THAT SHE CAN ENJOY SOMEWHAT THE 
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1 STANDARD OF LIVING TO WHICH THE PARTIES HAVE BECOME 
2 ACCUSTOMED. 
3 COURT FINDS THAT THE WIFE'S REASONABLE MONTHLY EXPENSES, 
4 INCLUDING THE DEBT TO AMERICA FIRST CREDIT UNION FOR HER 
5 AUTOMOBILE, IS $2200 A MONTH. AND THE COURT FINDS THAT THAT 
6 IS VERY MODEST AND MAYBE SOMEWHAT A LITTLE UNREALISTIC, BUT 
7 WILL ACCEPT THAT AS HER INCOME. SHE ALSO HAS SOME CONSUMER 
8 DEBT THAT THE COURT WILL DISCUSS SHORTLY. 
9 I FIND THAT HER NET INCOME IS APPROXIMATELY 1003. SHE 
10 ALSO HAS CHILD SUPPORT, NET CHILD SUPPORT AFTER THE DEDUCTION 
11 FOR INSURANCE OF $285. 
12 COURT FINDS THAT THE HUSBAND'S REASONABLE MONTHLY 
13 EXPENSES ARE SOMEWHERE AROUND $1972. HE DELINEATED OTHER 
14 EXPENSES AND CERTAINLY HE COULD CLAIM THOSE, BUT THE COURT 
15 TRIED TO FIX WHAT SEEMED TO BE REASONABLE FOR HIM AND JUST HIM 
16 AND NOT THE OTHER PEOPLE THAT ARE LIVING WITH HIM. AND THE 
17 COURT ALSO TRIED TO WEIGH THAT AGAINST WHAT HER INCOME WAS 
18 SINCE AFTER ALL THESE YEARS THE PARTIES ARE ENTITLED TO 
19 ESSENTIALLY THE SAME STANDARD OF LIVING. 
20 COURT FINDS THAT HIS REASONABLE MONTHLY INCOME WILL BE 
21 $493 5 A MONTH. AFTER TAKING OUT — 
22 MR. FLORENCE: HOW MUCH WAS THAT, 49 WHAT? 
23 THE COURT: 4935. AFTER TAKING OUT TOTAL TAXES, 
24 ESTIMATED TO BE ABOUT 35 PERCENT, I FIND THAT HIS NET INCOME 
25 WILL BE SOMEWHERE AROUND $3208. IT'S THE JUDGMENT OF THE 
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COURT THAT A REASONABLE AMOUNT OF ALIMONY FOR THE PLAINTIFF 
SHOULD BE $1100 PER MONTH ON A PERMANENT BASIS, SUBJECT TO 
MODIFICATION OR TERMINATION BY OPERATION OF LAW. 
IN MAKING THIS AWARD, THE COURT IS COGNIZANT OF THE 
FOLLOWING THINGS: IS COGNIZANT OF HER CLAIM FOR BETTER 
TRANSPORTATION. I'M ALSO COGNIZANT THAT THE CHILD SUPPORT IS 
GOING TO TERMINATE IN LESS THAN A YEAR. THERE IS SOME CASE 
LAW THAT SUGGESTS THAT WHEN THAT TERMINATES THAT THE — THAT A 
WIFE CAN COME IN AND SEEK A PETITION FOR MODIFICATION TO OPEN 
THE ALIMONY QUESTION. THE COURT WILL NOT PERMIT THAT IN JUNE 
OF 1994. IN OTHER WORDS, IN LOOKING AT ALIMONY, I HAVE 
ANTICIPATED THAT. 
AND FINALLY, THE COURT IS ALSO COGNIZANT THAT SHE IS 
ELIGIBLE, OR IN THE FUTURE, TO HAVE A MODEST INCREASE IN HER 
WAGES. AND I'M TRYING TO SEE WHERE THAT WAS. APPARENTLY SHE 
COULD BE AN AREA COORDINATOR WITHOUT A DEGREE OR ONE STEP 
HIGHER'AND RECEIVE A DOLLAR AN HOUR MORE. 
THE COURT IN THAT REGARD WILL FURTHER FIND THAT SHE IS 4 5 
YEARS OF AGE. THAT SHE WAS MARRIED WHEN SHE WAS 19. FIND 
FURTHER THAT SHE HAS PRIMARILY WORKED IN RETAIL SALES AND ALSO 
HAD A BRIEF STINT AS A DENTIST FOR TWO AND A HALF YEARS. THAT 
SHE'S WORKED A TOTAL OF 16 YEARS OUT OF THE MARRIAGE. THERE 
WAS A PERIOD OF ABOUT EIGHT YEARS AFTER THE SECOND CHILD WHEN 
SHE DIDN'T WORK. FIND THAT SHE IS PROBABLY EMPLOYED AT HER 
HIGHEST AND BEST EMPLOYMENT. 
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1 WITH RESPECT TO THE DEBTS, THE COURT FINDS THAT THERE 
2 WILL BE APPROXIMATELY $12,225 REMAINING AFTER PAYMENT OF 
3 PLAINTIFF'S RENT FOR AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER. PARTIES ALSO HAVE 
4
 A RESERVE ACCOUNT OF APPROXIMATELY $1170. THESE TWO SUMS ARE 
5 TO BE COMBINED AND THE PARTIES ARE TO PAY OFF THE FOLLOWING 
6 DEBTS WHICH THE COURT ADJUDGES TO BE MARITAL DEBTS, AND TO 
7 FACILITATE YOUR NOTETAKING, YOU MAY WANT TO LOOK AT MR. 
8 FLORENCE'S EXHIBIT "B", WHICH WAS EXHIBIT 11 IN THE TRIAL. 
9 THESE ARE THE FOLLOWING MARITAL DEBTS: NORWEST, R.C. WILLEY, 
10 ZION'S, FIRST SECURITY BANK, ZCMI, NORDSTROM, COLONIAL 
11 NATIONAL BANK, AND THAT'S IT. 
12 IF MY ARITHMETIC IS CORRECT — AND I COULD HAVE MADE A 
13 MISTAKE, BUT I THINK IT'S ROUGHLY ABOUT $8740 THAT THE COURT 
14 ADJUDGES TO BE MARITAL DEBT. THAT DEBT IS TO BE PAID OUT OF 
15 THE BALANCE OF THE HOME EQUITY PROCEEDS INCLUDING THE RESERVE 
16 ACCOUNT. AND THAT ANY LEFT-OVER EQUITY IS TO BE DIVIDED 
17 EQUALLY. 
18
 THE COURT ORDERS THE PLAINTIFF TO ASSUME THE FOLLOWING 
19 INDEBTEDNESS: MERVYN'S, AMERICA FIRST CREDIT UNION FOR THE 
20 '84 TOYOTA, LITTLE AUDREY'S, AND EXPRESS CLOTHING, AND ANY 
21 || OTHER DEBTS THAT SHE HAS INCURRED SEPARATELY IN HER OWN NAME. 
22 [I THE DEFENDANT IS TO ASSUME ALL OTHER INDEBTEDNESS THAT 
23 HAS NOT BEEN EXPRESSLY DESIGNATED AS MARITAL DEBT INCLUDING 
24 THE TAHITI BOAT AND THE DEBTS THAT HE'S INCURRED SEPARATELY IN 
25 I  HIS NAME. 
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IN LOOKING AT THE PROPERTY, THE PARTIES HAVE STIPULATED— 
MR. FLORENCE: ARE YOU LEAVING DEBTS, YOUR HONOR? 
THE COURT: YES, I AM. IS THERE ANYTHING I 
OVERLOOKED? 
MR. FLORENCE: WELL, I DON'T KNOW IF YOU HAVE OR HAVEN'T. 
ON THE TOP OF EXHIBIT "Bff OR EXHIBIT 11, AVCO, YOU DID NOT 
MENTION THAT AND I DIDN'T KNOW IF THAT WAS BY DESIGN OR 
OMISSION. 
THE COURT: THAT'S HIS. THANK YOU FOR CLARIFYING 
THAT. I HAVE AN "H" BY IT AND THAT'S HIS DEBT. 
MR. FLORENCE: OKAY. 
THE COURT: AND I MEANT TO COVER THAT. THANK YOU. 
ARE THERE ANY OTHER QUESTIONS ABOUT THE DEBT ALLOCATION? 
MR. FLORENCE: NO. 
MR. HAMILTON: JUST ONE THING THAT I WASN'T CLEAR ON, AND 
THAT WAS RELEVANT TO THE BALANCE THAT WE WERE GOING TO USE, 
THE 12,225, I CAN'T REMEMBER IF THAT WAS BEFORE OR AFTER HER 
AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER RENT WERE INCLUDED. YOU MENTIONED THAT 
BRIEFLY. 
THE COURT? NO, THAT IS TO BE PAID AND THEN WHATEVER 
IS LEFT OVER IS TO BE THEN APPLIED TOWARD THE DEBT. 
NOW, WITH RESPECT TOT HE PROPERTY, AS I UNDERSTAND MY 
RESPONSIBILITY, YOU HAVE STIPULATED THE ALLOCATION, BUT THERE 
WAS SOME DISPUTE OVER VALUES, AND YET I REALLY DIDN'T RECEIVE 
A LOT OF DIRECTION FROM EITHER OF YOU IN TERMS OF WHAT YOU 
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1 WANTED ME TO DO TO REMEDY WHAT EVEN BY BOTH SCHEDULES APPEARS 
2 TO BE SOMEWHAT OF A DISPARITY. OF COURSE MR. HAMILTON'S 
3 SCHEDULE IS MUCH CLOSER IN VALUES THAN YOURS, MR. FLORENCE, 
4 AND I'M NOT SURE THAT BASED ON THE AMOUNT OF TESTIMONY THAT I 
5 HEARD THAT I CAN DO ANYTHING OTHER THAN JUST AWARD EACH PARTY 
6 THE PROPERTY THAT HAS BEEN DESIGNATED IN THESE SCHEDULES, AND 
7 AWARD TO HIM ALSO THE TOOLS THAT APPARENTLY WERE OMITTED ON 
8 ONE SCHEDULE. ALTHOUGH THERE, EVEN BY BOTH SCHEDULES, THERE 
9 IS A SLIGHT DISPARITY IN VALUES, IT'S THE JUDGMENT OF THE 
10 COURT THAT HE'S IN A MUCH BETTER POSITION TO REPLACE THOSE 
11 THAN SHE IS. I SUSPECT THAT HE'LL WORK MORE THAN THE OVERTIME 
12 I HAVE IDENTIFIED, AND WHEN HE DOES, HE'S MAKING A GOOD WAGE, 
13 AT TIME AND A HALF AND SOMETIMES DOUBLE TIME. I SUSPECT IF 
14 SHE WERE TO GO OUT AND GET A SECOND JOB TO TRY TO REPLACE SOME 
15 OF THESE THINGS, IT WOULD NOT BE MUCH OF AN INCOME, SO JUST 
16 WEIGHING EVERYTHING, I'M JUST GOING TO AWARD EACH PARTY THOSE 
17 ITEMS OF PERSONALTY THAT HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED IN THE 
18 SCHEDULES. 
19 HOWEVER, THERE WERE SOME RESTRICTIONS THAT MR. FLORENCE 
20 INDICATED IN HIS SCHEDULE AND I DON'T HAVE THAT RIGHT IN FRONT 
21 OF ME, BUT LET ME RECALL AS BEST I CAN. HE IDENTIFIED WITH AN 
22 ASTERISK SOME PROPERTY THAT HE WANTED IN THE EVENT SHE EVER 
23 DECIDED TO SELL THEM. AND I WILL GRANT THAT REQUEST SO THAT 
24 HE, IF SHE DECIDES TO SELL THEM, SHE'S TO GIVE HIM A RIGHT OF 
25 FIRST REFUSAL. 
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THAT SHE MAY HAVE SINCE OUR LAST HEARING OR ORDER — OR SINCE 
THE SEPARATION THAT THAT IS A MARITAL DEBT? 
THE COURT: HOW MUCH WAS USED, MR. FLORENCE? 
MR. FLORENCE: THAT'S WHAT I DON'T REMEMBER. I'M NOT 
SURE THAT IT WAS SPECIFIC OTHER THAN SHE, AS I RECALL, SAID 
THAT SHE HAD MADE SOME CHARGES THERE WHILE THIS MATTER WAS 
PENDING. 
THE COURT: LET ME SEE IF I CAN FIND ANYTHING — 
MR. HAMILTON: TOTAL BILL WAS ABOUT 250 BUCKS LOOKS LIKE. 
MR. FLORENCE: THAT'S WHAT IT WAS WHEN I THINK THEY 
SEPARATED OR HE STARTED MAKING PAYMENTS, BUT I'M NOT — THAT 
EXHIBIT — 
MR. HAMILTON: THAT'S WHAT MY EXHIBIT SHOWS THAT IT HAD A 
BALANCE OF ABOUT 250. 
. THE COURT: I DON'T SEE ANYTHING IN MY NOTES RELATIVE 
TO THAT, AND I TOOK SOME NOTES ON EACH OF THOSE THINGS AS — 
ON THE COURTESY COPY YOU PROVIDED TO ME. FOR SOME REASON, MR. 
FLORENCE, THERE'S JUST NOTHING BY THAT. AND DO YOU RECALL 
ANYTHING, MR. HAMILTON? 
MR. HAMILTON: I DON'T. AND IT MAY BE SOMETHING THAT 
CAME OUT — CAME BEFOREHAND. ALL I CAN SAY IS THAT I KNOW 
THAT THERE'S — THAT ON THE EXHIBIT THAT I PROVIDED IT WAS 
ABOUT 250 BUCKS. 
MR. FLORENCE: WELL, IF THAT'S WHAT IT IS, I DON'T HAVE A 
PROBLEM WITH IT. WHAT I WORRY ABOUT, AND I MAY BE WAY OFF, 
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1 BUT WHAT I WORRY ABOUT IS THAT WHEN HE GETS DOWN TO STARTING 
2 TO PAY THE BILL OFF, ALL OF THE SUDDEN RATHER THAN 250, WE 
3 FIND THAT IT'S A THOUSAND OR TWO THOUSAND AND THAT THERE HAVE 
4 BEEN CHARGES MADE IN THE LAST MONTH OR SO. 
5 THE COURT: OKAY. WELL, LET ME JUST DO THIS TO ALLAY 
6 THOSE CONCERNS? I WILL MAKE A FINDING THAT THE BILL TO 
7 NORDSTROM'S IS APPROXIMATELY $250. AND THAT IF THERE HAS BEEN 
8 ANYTHING INCREASED OVER THAT SUM BY THE PLAINTIFF, IT IS HER 
9 INDEBTEDNESS. 
10 MR. HAMILTON: OKAY. 
11 THE COURT: IS THERE ANYTHING ELSE? 
12 MR. FLORENCE: LET ME MAKE SURE I UNDERSTAND ABOUT THESE 
13 AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER RENTAL PAYMENTS THAT SHE TOOK OUT OF THAT 
14 MONEY. YOU'RE INTENDING TO GIVE HER THAT OFF THE TOP, IS THAT 
15 WHAT YOU SAID? 
16 THE COURT: YES. NOW, IT WAS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT HE 
17 WAS ORDERED, WAS HE NOT, TO PAY HER RENT? 
18 MR. FLORENCE: HE WAS ORDERED TO PAY THE HOUSE PAYMENT 
19 AND ALL OF THE BILLS ON A TEMPORARY BASIS, YES. 
20 THE COURT: YEAH, DID THAT OCCUR DURING THAT TIME? 
21 MR. FLORENCE: YES. 
22 THE COURT: OKAY. THEN IT'S — THEN AS I RECALL, SHE 
23 IS — SHE TOOK SOME MONEY OUT OF THAT AND PAID THAT, IS THAT 
24 RIGHT? 
25 MR. FLORENCE: CORRECT. AND THAT WAS WHAT — THAT WAS 
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PURSUANT TO MY AGREEMENT THAT WE WOULD RESERVE THAT AS AN 
ISSUE FOR YOU TO DECIDE. I JUST WANT TO MAKE SURE WHAT YOUR 
DECISION WAS, SO — 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. HAMILTON: AND THEN RELATIVE TO THE OCTOBER, I JUST 
ASSUME THAT'S COMING OFF OF HER SHARE OF WHAT'S LEFT AFTER THE 
PAYMENT OF THE DEBTS. 
THE COURT: THAT'S CORRECT. 
MR. HAMILTON: RIGHT. 
MR. FLORENCE: OKAY. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU VERY MUCH. 
MR. FLORENCE: DAVID, DO YOU MIND SPLIT — SHARING THE 
COST OF HAVING A COPY OF THE TRANSCRIPT PREPARED BY DEAN AND 
ILL PAY HALF AND YOU PAY HALF? 
MR. HAMILTON: THAT'S AS FAR AS THE ORDER FOR TODAY? 
MR. FLORENCE: YES. 
MR. HAMILTON: YEAH, THAT'S FINE. 
MR. FLORENCE: I S THAT ALL RIGHT WITH THE COURT REPORTER? 
THE COURT: HE 'S SMILING YES. 
OKAY. 
ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU. 
BYE. 
MR. FLORENCE: 
THE COURT: 
MR. FLORENCE: 
MR. HAMILTON: BYE. 
* * * * * 
0 u, .J 
CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss 
COUNTY OF WEBER) 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING 13 PAGES OF 
TRANSCRIPT CONSTITUTE A TRUE AND ACCURATE RECORD OF THE 
PROCEEDINGS TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND ABILITY AS A 
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH. 
DATED AT OGDEN, UTAH THIS 1ST DAY OF NOVEMBER 1993. 
DEAN OLSEN, CSR 
2. A COPY OF TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
DAVID R. HAMILTON (1318) of 
GRIDLEY, WARD, HAVAS, HAMILTON & SHAW ^ j :;, £ ^ 
Attorney for Plaintiff ^ u 
635 25th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 621-3317 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
VICKIE L. CROMPTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CLIFFORD BRENT CROMPTON, 
Defendant. 
This matter came on regularly for trial before the Honorable Michael D. Lyon, one of 
the Judges of the above-entitled Court, on September 28, 1993, and the Plaintiff appeared in 
person and with counsel, David R. Hamilton, and the Defendant appeared in person and with 
counsel, Brian R. Florence, and the parties having testified in their own behalf and counsel 
having argued the case, and the Court being fully advised, now makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Plaintiff is an actual and bona fide resident of Weber County, State of Utah, 
and has been for more than three (3) months immediately prior to the commencement of the 
action. 
2. Plaintiff and Defendant are husband and wife, having married on or about 
December 8, 1967 in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
* FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
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3. Two (2) children have been born as issue of the marriage, one of whom is a 
minor, to-wit: Kimberly, age 17. Kimberly will graduate from high school in June, 1994. 
4. Plaintiff is a fit and proper person to be awarded the care, custody and control 
of the parties' minor child. 
5. Defendant is entitled to reasonable rights of visitation. 
6. There are irreconcilable differences between the parties which will not permit the 
marital relationship to continue. 
7. The Plaintiff should be awarded a Decree of Divorce, the same to become final 
upon signature and entry thereof. 
8. The parties stipulated to the following items: 
A. That the Plaintiff be awarded the care, custody and control of the 
parties' minor child, Kimberly, subject to Defendant's rights of reasonable 
visitation. 
fi. That the Defendant pay to Plaintiff the sum of $333.90 per month, 
as and for child support, one-half (1/2) on or before the 5th and the remaining 
one-half (1/2) on or before the 20th day of each month. All payments are to be 
made directly to Plaintiff unless otherwise directed by Plaintiff in writing. The 
support award is calculated utilizing Plaintiff's gross monthly income of 
$1,343.00 and the Defendant's gross monthly income on a 40 hour per week 
basis of $3,158.00 per month. The Defendant is given a $46.00 credit towards 
the health insurance premium that he pays to insure the minor child, resulting in 
a net monthly support payment of $285.00. The payments shall be made until the 
minor child's 18th birthday or graduation from high school with her normal 
graduating class, whichever occurs later. 
C. Each party shall assume and pay any debts that they have 
individually incurred since the separation. 
D. The Defendant is to be awarded the following items of personal 
property, subject to the debts and encumbrances owing thereon, which he is to 
assume and pay and hold Plaintiff harmless thereon: 
a. 1992 Nissan Pathfinder (lease). 
b. Tahiti Ski Boat, trailer and paraphernalia. 
c. Snow blower. 
d. Video camera. 
e. Computer. 
f. Stereo equipment. 
g. Wheelbarrow, 
h. 14-foot ladder. 
i. Defendant's mountain bike. 
j . Defendant's snow ski equipment. 
k. Defendant's ski diving equipment. 
1. Camping equipment, with exception of those items of Plaintiff. 
E. The Plaintiff is to be awarded the balance of the marital personal 
property. 
F. That each party have a Woodward interest in the other's 
retirement/pension benefits. 
G. That each party conform with the requirements of the Standard 
Medical Provisions. 
H. The Defendant shall maintain his present life insurance program, 
naming the parties' children as primary beneficiaries thereof, but he may add 
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other biological children as pro rata beneficiaries. 
9. Those stipulated items are reasonable and accepted by the Court and should be 
made a part of the Decree of Divorce. 
10. The Plaintiff is employed by Mervyn's and earns a gross monthly income of 
$1,343.00, with a monthly net of $1,003.00. 
11. The Defendant is employed as an electrician at Kimberly Clark and has been for 
eight (8) years. The Defendant's base income of $1,458.00 every two weeks. The Defendant 
has worked a substantial number of overtime hours on a weekly basis, including days off, to 
help with the family debts. Defendant's overtime is not guaranteed; however, historically, the 
overtime has ran at least 20 to 30 hours per pay period, including double-time on Sundays. It 
is likely that the Defendant will continue to work overtime. 
12. Defendant's historical income has been in the $60,000.00 to $70,000.00 range per 
year. 
13. it is not reasonable that the Defendant will continue to work the same number of 
hours to support a failed marriage; occasionally, parties will work an excess number of hours 
to support a family, and in the current circumstances, the Court will not impute anticipated 
annual income. 
14. The Court anticipates that a reasonable work period for the Defendant would-be 
55 hours per week. The same would be necessary to assist Plaintiff to enjoy a standard of living 
which is somewhat representative of the standard to which she has become accustom during the 
marriage. The Plaintiffs reasonable living expenses, including payment on her automobile are 
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approximately $2,200.00. This amount is modest and perhaps unrealistically low. 
15. In addition to the Plaintiffs net income of $1,003.00 per month, she will have 
monthly child support of $285.00, for a total of $1,288.00 in available monies. 
16. The Defendant's reasonable expenses are set at approximately $1,972.00. This 
represents expenses for the Defendant alone, not calculating the expenses of others in his home. 
17. The Plaintiff is 45 years of age, having been married to the Defendant at age 19. 
The Plaintiff has worked historically in retail sales, except for approximately two and one-half 
(2-1/2) years work in a dental office. Plaintiff has, in fact, worked during approximately 16 
years of the marriage. The Plaintiffs current employment is the "highest and best" employment 
available to Plaintiff. 
18. The parties are entitled to an approximately equal standard of living. The 
Plaintiffs reasonable monthly gross income will be approximately $4,935.00, with taxes 
reducing the amount by 35%, resulting in a monthly net of $3,208.00. 
19. The Plaintiff is in need and unable to satisfy her needs through her monthly 
income and the Defendant does have an ability to pay alimony. The Plaintiff should be awarded 
and the Defendant Ordered to pay permanent alimony in the sum of $1,100.00 per month. The 
alimony should be paid until Plaintiffs death, cohabitation and/or remarriage. 
20. In making a determination of the alimony award, the Court is aware of the 
following specific circumstances: 
A. The Plaintiff has a claim for better transportation, in view of the 
age and condition of her automobile. 
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B. The Defendant's obligation for child support will terminate in less 
than a year. The Plaintiff specifically will not be entitled to seek a modification 
of the Order at the time the minor child graduates from high school, as the Court 
has considered that fact in arriving at a calculation for the alimony. 
C. The Plaintiff is eligible for only modest increases in her wage, in 
view of her experience and the availability for advancement at her company. 
21. There remains approximately $12,225.00 in proceeds available from the sale of 
the parties' house, after payment of Plaintiffs rent of $500.00 each for August, September, 
October and November, 1993. In addition, there is $1,170.00 in a reserve account, for a total 
of $13,395.00. 
22. The parties have incurred debts and obligations during the marriage. 
23. The $13,395.00 should be utilized to pay the following marital debts of the 
parties: 
A. Norwest, with a current balance of $204.55. 
B. R.C. Willey's, with a current balance of $124.31. 
C. Zions Bank, with a current balance of $951.35. 
D. First Security Bank, with a current balance of $2,124.16. 
E. ZCMI, with a current balance of $341.24. 
F. Nordstrom, with a current balance of $253.12. 
G. Colonial National, with a current balance of $3,791.70. 
24. After satisfaction of the aforementioned debts, any remaining balance should be 
divided equally between the parties, noting that the $500.00 paid to Plaintiffs landlord for 
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October and November shall be credited against Plaintiffs share. 
25. There are remaining debts which should be paid as follows: 
A. Plaintiff should pay Mervyn's, America First Credit Union on her 
1984 Toyota, Li'l Audrey's, Discover Card and Express Clothing, together with 
any separate indebtedness she may have incurred, holding Defendant harmless 
thereon. 
B. Defendant should pay America First Credit Union on the Tahiti 
boat, Avco, and any separate indebtedness he may have incurred, holding 
Plaintiff harmless thereon. 
26. The parties stipulated to the division of personal property and although there is 
a slight disparity with Plaintiff receiving more dollar value, the Defendant is better positioned 
to replace items than is the Plaintiff. The Defendant is specifically given a first right of refusal 
to purchase the following items, should Plaintiff decide to sell them: Brass tableware and 
Noritaki China. Further, the parties should cooperate to copy all family photos, video and Super 
8 films and divide the cost equally. 
27. The Plaintiff has incurred substantial attorney's fees and is in need of assistance 
to satisfy the same. Plaintiffs income is modest and her income is necessary to simply satisfy 
her basic expenses. 
28. There is a relative parody between the parties in their incomes, in view of the 
alimony award and the Defendant is not in a position to pay anything towards Plaintiff's fees 
and, thus, each party should be Ordered to pay their own attorney's fees and costs. 
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BASED UPON the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court hereby makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce against the Defendant. 
2. The Plaintiff should be awarded the care, custody and control of the parties' minor 
child, subject to reasonable visitation, which is set forth in the Standard Order of Visitation 
which is in operative effect in the district. 
3. The Plaintiff should receive and Defendant Ordered to pay, as and for child 
support, the net sum of $285.00 per month, to begin immediately and remain payable until the 
child turns 18 or graduates from high school with her normal graduating class. Said support 
shall be paid one-half on or before the 5th and one-half on or before the 20th day of each month. 
Further, the Defendant shall maintain the medical, dental and health insurance for the benefit 
of the children, with each party paying one-half of any non-covered medical or dental expenses 
incurred on behalf of the children, pursuant to the Standard Medical Provisions currently in 
effect in the district. 
4. The Plaintiff should receive and the Defendant Ordered to pay alimony in the sum 
of $1,100.00 per month, until Plaintiffs death, cohabitation or remarriage, beginning 
immediately. Said alimony payments shall be made on or before the 20th day of each month. 
5. The Plaintiff is awarded, pursuant to'the Woodward decision, one-half of 
Defendant's retirement proceeds. The Plaintiffs counsel shall prepare a Qualified Domestic 
Relations Order to accomplish the same. 
6. From the proceeds available from the home in reserve account, the following 
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debts should be paid: Norwest, R.C. Willey's, Zions, First Security Bank, ZCMI, Nordstrom 
and Colonial National Bank, with any remaining proceeds to be divided equally between the 
parties. 
7. The $1,000.00 was paid towards the Plaintiffs October and November rent should 
be calculated against her interest in the remaining proceeds. 
8. The Plaintiff should pay the obligations to Mervyn's, America First Credit Union 
on the 1984 Toyota, Li'l Audrey's, Discover Card and Express Clothing, together with her own 
separate debts and obligations. 
9. The Defendant should pay the obligations to America First Credit Union on the 
Tahiti boat and Avco, together with any separate debts and obligations he has incurred. 
10. The Defendant is to be awarded the following items of personal property, subject 
to the debts and encumbrances owing thereon, which he is to assume and pay and hold Plaintiff 
harmless thereon: 
a. 1992 Nissan Pathfinder (lease). 
b. Tahiti Ski Boat, trailer and paraphernalia 
c. Snow blower. 
d. Video camera. 
e. Computer. 
f. Stereo equipment. 
g. Wheelbarrow, 
h. 14-foot ladder. 
i. Defendant's mountain bike. 
j . Defendant's snow ski equipment. 
k. Defendant's sky diving equipment. 
1. Camping equipment, with exception of those items of Plaintiff. 
11. The Plaintiff is to be awarded the balance of the marital personal property. 
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costs. 
12. Each party should be responsible to pay their own respective attorney's fees and 
DATED this J7jrf day of November, 1993. 
PROVEDAS TO FORM 
Brian R. Florence 
Attorney for Defendant 
MICHAEL D. LYdN I I 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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3. A COPY OF DECREE OF DIVORCE. 
MCRORLM ROLL 1 7 2 PAGE 1 8 1 
DAVID R. HAMILTON (1318) of 
GRIDLEY, WARD, HAVAS, HAMILTON & SHAWo ,-?] 2 23 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
635 25th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 621-3317 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
VICKIE L. CROMPTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CLIFFORD BRENT CROMPTON, 
Defendant. 
This matter came on regularly for trial before the Honorable Michael D. Lyon, one of 
the Judges of the above-entitled Court, on September 28, 1993, and the Plaintiff appeared in 
person and with counsel, David R. Hamilton, and the Defendant appeared in person and with 
counsel, Brian R. Florence, and the parties having testified in their own behalf and counsel 
having argued the case, and the Court being fully advised, and having previously made its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now enters the following: 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
1. The Plaintiff is hereby awarded a Decree of Divorce against the Defendant. 
2. The Plaintiff is awarded the care, custody and control of the parties' minor child, 
subject to reasonable visitation, which is set forth in the Standard Order of Visitation which is 
in operative effect in the district. 
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3. The Defendant is Ordered to pay to Plaintiff, as and for child support, the net sum 
of $285.00 per month, to begin immediately and remain payable until the child turns 18 or 
graduates from high schooLwith her normal graduating class. Said support shall be paid one-
half on or before the 5th and one-half on or before the 20th day of each month. Further, the 
Defendant shall maintain the medical, dental and health insurance for the benefit of the children, 
with each party paying one-half of any non-covered medical or dental expenses incurred on 
behalf of the children, pursuant to the Standard Medical Provisions currently in effect in the 
district. 
4. The Defendant is Ordered to pay to Plaintiff, as and for alimony, the sum of 
$1,100.00 per month, until Plaintiffs death, cohabitation or remarriage, beginning immediately. 
Said alimony payments shall be made on or before the 20th day of each month. 
5. The Plaintiff is awarded, pursuant to the Woodward decision, one-half of 
Defendant's retirement proceeds. The Plaintiff's counsel shall prepare a Qualified Domestic 
Relations Order to accomplish the same. 
6. From the proceeds available from the home in reserve account, the following 
debts are to be paid: Norwest, R.C. Willey's, Zions, First Security Bank, ZCMI, Nordstrom 
and Colonial National Bank, with any remaining proceeds to be divided equally between the 
parties. 
7. The $1,000.00 that was paid towards the Plaintiffs October and November rent 
should be calculated against her interest in the remaining proceeds. 
8. The Plaintiff is to pay the obligations to Mervyn's, America First Credit Union 
on the 1984 Toyota, Li'l Audrey's, Discover Card and Express Clothing, together with her own 
separate debts and obligations. 
9. The Defendant is to pay the obligations to America First Credit Union on the 
Tahiti boat and Avco, together with any separate debts and obligations he has incurred. 
10. The Defendant is awarded the following items of personal property, subject to the 
debts and encumbrances owing thereon, which he is to assume and pay and hold Plaintiff 
harmless thereon: 
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
e. 
f. 
g. 
h. 
k. 
1. 
1992 Nissan Pathfinder (lease). 
Tahiti Ski Boat, trailer and paraphernalia 
Snow blower. 
Video camera. 
Computer. 
Stereo equipment. 
Wheelbarrow. 
14-foot ladder. 
Defendant's mountain bike. 
Defendant's snow ski equipment. 
Defendant's sky diving equipment. 
Camping equipment, with exception of those items of Plaintiff. 
11. The Plaintiff is awarded the balance of the marital personal property. 
12. Each party is to pay their own respective attorney's fees and costs. 
DATED this day of November, 1993. 
MICHAEL D. LYON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
/7 NdCA 
>ROVEQASTOFORM 
IJJ^A1< 
Jrian i . Florence 
Attorney for Defendant 
- ^ = 
Crompton v. Crompton 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
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4. A COPY OF PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 1 (MRS. CROMPTON'S PAY 
CHECK). 
MERVYN'S 
2232T FOOTHILL BLVD. 
HAYWARO 
Description Rate 
CA 
REGULAR EARNING 
HQLl04VNaT-WKp! 
CROMPTON. VICKIE L 
0145 
94541 WuiWiWm 
Hours Earnings Year-to-Date 
Taxes/Ded Year-to-Date 
>•""•{ i 
,'tr ,tj 
.>>"'V,V'* 
7,7500 
7,7500 
77500 
siviw.^i 
32,00 
4qoo 
600 
248,00 
3 1 0 0 0 
6200 
9941,62 
62000 
305,29 
FEOERAL TAX 
SOCIAL SEC TAX 
MEDICARE TAX, 
UTAH 
AOD/L LIFE 
SRSP-PRE-TAX 
SRSP-AFT-TAX 
UNITED HAY 
PRE-TAX TRAV. 
CHECK OEPOSIT 
4 '-',371.4 
-:;tJ869. 
:-V?21»5 
— ^ ,95 
12*0 
la&o 
2100 
44635 
1004,86 
71090 
166,26 i 
•-41702 : | 
1710 
23561 
35339j 
180Q 
210,00 
807652 
"YOU ARE 
Earnings 
KEY COMPONENT TOWARD OUR 
Taxes Deductions 
COMPANY'S 
Net Pay 
SUCCESS 
Pay Period Deposit # Deposit Amount 
Current 
Year-to-Date 
620100 
H800J05 
119|70 
2299,04 
53|95 
978110 
44635 
8 522191 
Begin 
End 
0 8 - 3 0 - 9 3 
0 9 - 1 2 - 9 3 
4 ? 0 4 0 9 44635 
MERvyars 
22327 Foothill Blvd. 
Hay ward, CA 94541-8515 
Bank Name 
/AMERICA FIRST CR 
0 9 - 2 2 - 9 3 
4 2 0 4 0 9 
Description fAccouht Number"^ 
UN CHECK DEPOSIT 20049359 
VICKIE 
1456 E. 
OGDEN 
L CROMPTON 
2525 N. 
No. 
Amount 
•-'«• 4 4 6 * 3 5 
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 
EXHIBIT NO. 
CASINO. 
DATE RICO V/??/ 
« EVIDENCE - r U 
CIERK JHxrrT^-
UT 84414 NOT NEGOTIABLE 
5. A COPY OF PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 3 (MR. CROMPTON'S INCOME 
INFORMATION). 
Kimberly-Clark 
September 24, 1993 
Second Judicial District Court Weber County 
State of Utah 
TO: Whom it May Concern 
Brent Cropmtonfs base wage for a two week period is $1,457.88. 
I have enclosed the following information that you have 
requested. 
Earnings year to date and hours for 1993 as of 
9-12-93. 
• Earnings year to date and hours for 1992 and 
1991. 
W2's for 1992 and 1991. 
• A list of the earnings codes and their 
description. 
Brent Cropmton pays $46.44 a month for medical and dental 
coverage. 
aSkwL hhocJk 
vJaJene Shock 
l y r o l l 
jap/93-037 
PLAINTIFFS EXHIBIT 
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Ai --""H" I ! 
EARNINGS INFORMATION 
RES- S" 
WORK S" 0 4 3 p A g r r>-j r j p f-)£ 
fcl W '"V F M 
TYPE 
ON OT 
:
. » j 
HL 
M' ! 
DESC 
r sc} \ ' " ' " ,A< 
M cr r \ T 1—• ~-T! i 1-Z.U I ^ i i U 
P P ^ - J A "3 
"PRP-TA") 
FUNERAL LEAVE 
HGLIDAY LEAVE SUN 
MI !T! \&\ AG^'^E^E^T 
PPPPONAL HOLIDAY 
MRS' NGT WKD FT)"* S 
TH-NOT IN 0,^ 
HT-MHT IN On*" 
REGULAR EARN 
HOURS X 1,5 
'••V 1 -w-
HOURS 
73, 00 
16! 00 
3u 00 
1 "r>t~\ '"""•> 
O S n n 
14! 50 
u OO 
•l 56 
!. 00 
OO 
4 J 
DOLLARS 
| Q " 7 ^ 
7 
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1r806"53 
ME 
UIT 
pui 
. PPP 
- RAG 
— PAL?E BACKNARI 
P P 1 o 
per -f { 
n v r r p 
If * V *fc 
W1026 k 
UNIT OISS 
EARN 
TYPE 
-63794-2 CROMPTON, 
DT 
HL 
MO 
PH 
PS 
P4 
P8 
P9 
RT 
TH 
TO 
TOTAL 
OYEE TOTAL 
YTD EARN 
DOL AMT 
C, BRENT 
13,303.95 
933.46 
111.48 
464.45 
650.00 
227.08 
17,543.80 
106.11 
29,065.40 
4,768.58 
4,575.15 
71,749.46 
71,749.46 
KEY 
FIELD 
AS 
KIMBERLY-CLARK CORPORATION 
ANNUAL EARNINGS AND HOURS BY TYPE 
OF QUARTER ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1991 
YTD EARN 
HOURS 
SALARIED NONEXEMPT H2 TOTAL * 71,749.46 
387.25 
56.00 
6.50 
28.00 
.00 
6.74 
688.50 
3.00 
1,693.50 
181.75 
136.00 
3,187.24 
3,187.24 
I *%Vt» t»J 
1 Control number 
I - 1 
„ opy D For Employer 
OMB No. 1545-0008 UT-W-2 
2 Employer's name, address, and ZIP code 
KCHQERLY-CLARK CORPORATION 
TAX DEPARTMENT B300 /1 
MOO H0LC0N8 8R(I3<;t: ROAD 
ROSMEt.L 6A 30076 
6 Statutory Deceasea Pension Legal 942 Subtotal Deferred Void 
employee clan reo. emp. comoensaoon 
• • & n n n n a 
7 Allocated tips 
9 Federal income tax withheld 
3 , 7 3 6 . 8 6 
8 Advance EIC payment 
10 Wages, tips, other compensation 
6 9 , 1 3 8 . 2 3 
3 Employers identification number 
39 0394230 
4 Employer's state I.D. number 
U44941 
11 Socia l secur i ty tax wi thheld 
3 , 3 3 2 . 6 5 
12 Social security wages 
5 4 , 5 5 3 . 8 7 
5 Employee s social security numoer 
5 2 * - 6 8 - 9 6 3 7 
13 Social security tips 14 Medicare wages and tips 
6 9 , 1 3 3 . 2 3 
19 Employee's name, address, and ZIP code 
C. URfZNT CROMPTON 
MS6 c eses N 
NORTH O«DGN 
0188 
15 Medicare tax withheld 
1 , 0 0 2 . 5 0 
16 Nonqualified plans 
17 See Instrs. for Form W-2 18 Other 
UT 84414 
24 State income 
t a x 2 , 1 3 2 . 6 7 
2 5 State wages, tips, etc. 
6 9 , 1 3 8 . £ 3 
22 Dependent care benefits 23 Benefits included in Box 10 
26 Name of state 
UT 
2 7 Local income tax 2 8 Local wages, tips, etc. 2 9 Name of locality 
IRS APP. Form W-2 Wage and Tax Statement 1992 
For Paperwork Reduction Act Notice and instructions for compieting this form, see separate instructions. 
Dept. of the Treasury—Internal Revenue Service 
1 Control number 
* - 1 
- v. 
OMB No 1545-0008 
2 Employer s name, address, and ZIP code 
K3MBEHLY -CLARK CORPORATION 
TAX DCPARTHENT U^OO/1 
1400 HOI COMH BR)D£G ROAf) 
R05WKU- SA .30076 
3 Employer s identification numoer 
5 Emoioyee s social security number 
SS9- 6«-*J6 *Y 
4 Employer s state I D number 
\ 4 4 9 4 1 
19 Employee s name, address, and ZIP code 
0 . ORfcNf CROUPTON 
11S6 C CSCS N 
NORTH OGOEN UT 64404 
018» 
smim/iimm 
24 State income tax 
S,0 / *5 . 72 
25 State wages, ops, etc. 
f 1 , 7 4 9 . 4 6 
mmm 
26 Name of state 
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9 Federal income tax withheld 
4 , 1 4 7 . 0 4 
11 Social security tax withheld 
S , 3 1 0 . 3 0 
13 Social security tips 
15 Medicare tax withheld 
1 , 0 4 0 . 3 f 
17 See Instrs. for Form W-2 
22 Dependent care benefits 
27 Local income tax 
8 Advance E1C payment 
10 Wages, tips, otner ccmDensacon 
7 1 , 7 4 9 . 4 6 
12 Social security wages 
5 5 , 4 0 0 . 0 0 
14 Medicare wages and tips 
n , 7 4 9 . 4 6 
16 Nonqualified plans 
18 Other 
23 Benefits included in Box 10 
28 Local wages, tips, etc 29 Name of locality 
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